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Despite extensive enquiry into the socio-political aspects of environmental impact
assessments (EIA), empirical material from east- and south-east Asia remains
underrepresented in English-language scholarship. This is notable given increasing
infrastructural developments and interest in environmental justice in the region. We
contribute to this field by evaluating the Miramar Resort EIA controversy in
Taitung County, Taiwan, to assess how a developer and a local government
conspired to circumvent an EIA process. Through documentary analysis and
stakeholder interviews, we assess the argumentation used by different actors to
articulate their support for or opposition to the development. We find that much
contention rests on claims to economic benefit and environmental protection that
cannot be verified, and on limited participation opportunities. We call for further
research into strategies used by proponents to discredit the knowledge and
experience of opponents within EIA processes, especially given rising global
interest in traditional, local and indigenous knowledge.
Keywords: environmental controversy; environmental impact assessment; public
participation; sustainable development; Taiwan
1. Introduction
Despite a long tradition of scholarship into controversies around environmental impact
assessment (EIA) and a widespread understanding in the social sciences that EIAs are
socially and politically mediated, the body of English-language literature into EIA con-
troversies in an east- and south-east Asian context is still developing. Although a num-
ber of studies exist at the state- or regional level into environmental assessment for
large-scale infrastructure in east- and south-east Asia (e.g. Johnson (2014) on China;
Hwang (2017) on Korea; Blake and Barney (2018) on Lao PDR), empirical assessment
of site-specific controversies and their impacts on communities is more limited (Fan,
Chiu, and Mabon 2020). Given the level of expected infrastructural development
(Moser 2020) and rising interest in the justice dimensions of responses to environmen-
tal change (Chou et al. 2020) for east- and south-east Asia, it is timely and relevant to
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consider how understandings of the societal contours of EIA processes derived from
Global North contexts are applicable to east- and south-east Asia, especially as regards
emerging economy and new democracy settings. This paper responds to this growing
field of scholarship through empirical evaluation of the Miramar Resort controversy in
Shanyuan Bay, Taitung County, Taiwan. The Miramar Resort issue is a long-running
controversy over the legality of the EIA process for a resort hotel built on the coast of
Taitung County in eastern Taiwan, in which the local government was accused of con-
spiring with the developer to circumvent EIA regulations and fast-track approval of
the development. We link our enquiry to existing empirical and conceptual material, in
order to make sense of the strategies used by the developer and local authority to cir-
cumvent a well-intentioned EIA process, and to understand how communities and less
empowered stakeholders’ knowledge and experiences may become discredited within
environmental assessments.
2. Conceptual background: environmental controversies and the potential for
manipulation
An EIA is defined by Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Administration (2019: np) as
“the processes of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical,
social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to making major deci-
sions and commitments.” Puig and Villarroya (2013) add that on the basis of an EIA,
avoidance, minimization, or compensation strategies may be adopted to counter envir-
onmental impacts.
Nonetheless, EIAs do not necessarily provide objective or value-neutral assessment
of environmental impacts, nor do they automatically lead to courses of action deemed
most beneficial to the environment and society. The role of “science” and evidence in
EIAs is not without contest (Cashmore 2004), and power and political dynamics may
be significant within EIA research (Cashmore and Richardson 2013). It has long been
argued that controversy is an integral part of technology assessment, and hence that
assessment of technologies and their impacts is an inherently social process
(Cambrosio and Limoges 1991). Lyytim€aki and Peltonen (2016) therefore conceive of
EIAs as focusing events, which can influence opinion and set agendas around a project
or the development trajectory of a locality. The social and political dynamics which
arise during the process of an EIA may hence be influenced by – and yield valuable
insight into – broader issues affecting a locality beyond a site-specific project, such as
in whose interest the environment is managed, whose knowledge counts, and who
holds power over environmental policy and planning decisions.
There are numerous examples globally of controversy within EIAs for new infra-
structure projects. Looking to the EIA process for the Tseng-Wen Reservoir
Transbasin Water Diversion Project in Taiwan, Fan (2016) argues that the EIA process
is inadequate to interpret local (especially indigenous) cultural heritage or to account
for socio-economic impacts. Reflecting on an EIA for coastal defenses and their effects
on fish farms in the Basque Country, Spain, Puig and Villarroya (2013) believe there
is a degree of subjectivity in identifying and assessing environmental “impacts”, and
that there are limits to the ability of economic methods to adequately determine
“compensation” for environmental impacts. For EIAs in onshore renewable energy
developments in Scotland, UK, Smart, Stojanovic, and Warren (2014) identify a lack
of clarity on the purpose of an EIA, and question the ability of EIAs for site-specific
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projects to assess the impacts of projects on regional- or global-scale processes such as
ecosystems and climate change. Spiegel (2017), in the context of EIAs for small-scale
mining in Zimbabwe, argues that enactment and enforcement of EIA processes may
embody ideas of how the environment “ought” to be managed and by whom, often at
the expense of small-scale and artisanal practitioners (in Spiegel’s case, miners).
Whilst the above is not intended to be an exhaustive list of examples, it gives a
sense of the methodological limitations of an EIA process and the power imbalances
that may be contained within. Nevertheless, although scholars such as Cambrosio and
Limoges (1991) see controversy and participation as a valuable part of technology
assessment, ability to participate in an EIA process is not equal across society (Tu
2010). Nor is it the case that all actors participate in good faith. Enrıquez-de-
Salamanca (2018) provides a typology of how the limitations outlined above may lead
to the good intentions of an EIA being hijacked by progress-oriented proponents of
developments, or by opponents of a project. These are: using false information in sup-
port of one’s position; proposing false alternatives or unnecessary elements to create
an illusion of choice and steer actors toward a desired outcome; exaggerating informa-
tion on the benefits or drawbacks of a development; hiding information about the
objectives or the characteristics of a project; undervaluing or over-valuing impacts to
downplay or emphasize the effect the project will have on the surrounding environ-
ment; providing confusing or complex information to discourage publics unfamiliar
with techno-scientific language from participation; self-censorship by actors to avoid
conflicts or reprisals; administrative manipulation of the EIA process by strategically
timing announcements or finding ways to circumvent the process; offering bribes and
kickbacks; and taking advantage of relationships of dependency in a manner amounting
to extortion.
In this paper we take Enriquez de Salamanca’s typology, and the associated schol-
arship and case studies on EIA controversies as a social process and use the case of
the Miramar Resort development in Taitung County, Taiwan, to elaborate how a devel-
oper and local authority may work to exploit the inadequacies of an EIA and generate
a desired outcome in practice.
3. Context: the Miramar resort dispute and environmentalism in Taiwan
3.1. The Miramar resort dispute
The focus of this paper is the controversy over the Miramar Resort development in
Shanyuan Bay in Taitung County, in the southeast part of Taiwan. Contestation over
the Miramar Resort has lasted for over a decade (see timeline in Table 1), and has cen-
tered on the legality of the EIA conducted for the project. Taiwan’s Central Mountain
Range has blocked Taitung Country from the western plain of Taiwan, where most of
the country’s development has taken place. The level of development here has been
far slower than the west part of Taiwan, hence a significant proportion of the natural
landscape remains. The eastern part of Taiwan is regarded as a pure “back garden” for
Taiwan free from damage from development, and hence is argued to function as a
“retreat” for people from elsewhere in Taiwan (Lin 2013; Huang 2014).
Taitung County and Shanyuan Bay may be considered a peripheral region accord-
ing to the three criteria of K€uhn (2015). Lack of innovation through low-qualified
work and decline of employment is illustrated by a decline in the number of working
age people in employment from 122,405 in 1990 to 98,295 in 2000 and 86,253 in
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Table 1. Timeline of Miramar Resort Conflict.
Year Relevant events
2003 Durban Group Limited Company proposes operations at Shanyuan lido to Taitung
County Government.
2004 Taitung County Government announces BOT (build, operate, and transfer) project in
cooperation with private sector for running Shanyuan lido.
In December, Durban Group Limited Company win a 50-year BOT contract to
manage land number 346 and 346-2, with total area of 59,956m2. The Company
sets up the Miramar Resort Limited Company to operate the project.
2005 In February, Miramar Resort sends a request to Taitung Tourism Bureau to repartition
original land numbers to new land numbers 346 and 346-4. Permission is granted to
create a new land number 346-4, with a total area of 9,997m2, to construct the
Resort’s main building.
The new parcel 346-4 (9997m2) falls below the Environmental Impact Assessment
Act minimum requirement of 1 hectare to conduct an EIA.
Miramar Resort makes a modification to increase number of guest rooms, and starts
construction after receiving permission of Taitung County government in October.
2006 Resort commences EIA for the whole area of 59,956m2 in April, however main
building construction has already begun.
2007 NGO Taitung Environmental Protection Union (Taitung Branch of Taiwan
Environmental Protection Union) discovers and reports to the local government that
the project had started construction without passing an EIA. Abandoned waste soil
along the coast is found.
However, no penalty or order to halt construction is issued from the local government.
Taitung Environmental Protection Union files a lawsuit against the invalid 9997m2
building permit.
In July, Environmental Protection Administration of Executive Yuan sends an official
order to the local government to cease Miramar Resort construction and conduct an
EIA correctly.
2008 On 23rd January, Kaohsiung High Administrative Court adjudges that Taitung County
Government should order the Miramar Resort to stop all development works on
land number 346-2.
However, instead of stopping the construction, Taitung County Government launches a fifth
EIA meeting. The project passes this meeting under conditions.
2009 On 10th August, Kaohsiung High Administrative Court adjudges the assessment of the
fifth EIA is invalid.
2010 On 7th September, Kaohsiung High Administrative Court adjudges the Miramar
Resort’s 9,997m2 building permit to be invalid.
The Miramar Resort successfully applies for a new 59,956m2 building permit from
the local government.
2012 On 19th January, Supreme Administrative Court adjudges the fifth EIA to be invalid.
Taitung County Government starts a sixth EIA meeting on 2nd June.
On 20th September, Supreme Administrative Court upholds the final verdict of
revoking the EIA and construction permit of the Resort.
Developers regard the ruling as only applicable to the 9,997m2 construction permit.
On 21st December, Taitung County Government launches a seventh EIA meeting,
and passes the project under conditions.
2013 Kaohsiung High Administrative Court upholds the ruling that the construction of the
Resort should be stopped.
2014 Kaohsiung High Administrative Court adjudges the assessment of the seventh EIA
as invalid.
2015 Kaohsiung High Administrative Court adjudges the reconstruction of the Resort as invalid.
2016 The Supreme Administrative Court adjudges the reconstruction of the Resort and the
seventh EIA were invalid. This is the final verdict.
2020 Arbitration concluded in October 2020, with the decision that Taitung County
Government must pay NTD 629 million to buy back the building.
(Data arrangement from Tai, Kong and Kou (2013); EPA; KHAC; and the Miramar Resort official website).
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2010 (DGBAS 2010). Poverty through out-migration and stigmatization may be
reflected in the reduction of the population of Beinan Township (in which the
Miramar Resort is located) from 24,420 in 1981 to 17,132 at end of 2019 (Ministry of
Interior Statistics 2021); and also by the land price index for Taitung County, which in
2013 (at the time of the development) was 79.91 for Taitung compared to 90.34 for
Taiwan as a whole, indicating notably lower land values in Taitung (Ministry of
Interior Statistics 2021). Powerlessness via dependency in decision-making and exclu-
sion from networks can be seen through the markedly higher proportion of indigenous
people – an often disempowered and marginalized group in Taiwan – at 36.47% for
Taitung County as of 2020 compared to 2.45% for whole of Taiwan (Ministry of
Interior Statistics 2021); and by the statement of the governor of Taitung County on
the cancellation of the Miramar Resort project claiming that the county relied upon
external investment for development (UDN News 2018). Understanding Taitung
County, and especially Shanyuan Bay, as a peripheral region matters in an EIA context
because extant research indicates that the social, economic and environmental margin-
ality of peripheral regions may create uneven power relations in development proc-
esses (Butler and Hinch 2006; Karrasch and Klenke 2016) and make it hard for
communities and local authorities to be able to resist new development proposals
(Blowers 1999). As the literature in Section 2 and our analysis and discussions in
Sections 5 and 6 illustrate, this peripherality may create conditions for the kind of
manipulative practices in EIAs outlined by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) to
take hold.
The Miramar Resort sits in Shanyuan Bay (see Figures 1 and 2). The bay used to
be a lido and is a natural sand beach, different to the more rugged coastal topography
typical of eastern Taiwan. The Amis indigenous name for the coastal area is
Fudafudak, but the name of Miramar Resort in Mandarin – Meiliwan – means
“beautiful bay”. This “beautiful bay” was used as a selling point to attract tourists to
the Miramar Resort. Tourism indeed has a central role in Taitung County’s economic
development (Taitung County Government 2018; Mak 2017). However, whilst the
beautiful scenery forms the basis of a tourist resort, other values and interests are
invested in the landscape. The Amis people, a branch of Taiwan’s indigenous people,
dwell closely to the resort site. Specifically, a tribe called the Tzu-Tung inhabit the
southern part of Shanyuan Bay (Tai, Kong, and Kou 2012). Viewing the ocean as a
foundation of nature and interacting with the natural environment in a harmonious way
is core to how the Amis people value the environment (Smith 2015).
Although the physical construction area of the Miramar Resort is relatively small,
the dispute over the resort was not resolved for more than ten years. Developer Miramar
and the Taitung County Government (the local government representing the locality)
were in favor of the development. Some members of the Amis people, environmental
protection groups such as the Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association and Citizen of
the Earth were however in opposition (see summary in Table 2). As we will illustrate,
there is of course a diverse range of views within the “for” and “against” positions.
Groups opposed to the resort development accused Miramar of intentionally avoid-
ing conducting an EIA prior to construction. The Miramar Resort asked Taitung
County Government to fit their development needs and modify land numbers to create
a new separate parcel of 9,997m2 for the Resort to build their main building.
Taiwanese EIA regulations state that the requirement area for conducting an EIA is 1
hectare. Thus, a 9,997m2 parcel is excluded from this restriction. This led to claims
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that developers Miramar were deliberately avoiding doing an EIA. It is also notable
that because Miramar submitted their application as a general hotel, the EIA would be
overseen by Taitung County Government. Had they applied as a tourist hotel, the
application would have been assessed by the central government.
Environmental lawyer Chan (2013) explains that the local government (Taitung
County Government) held three roles in the planning and development process for the
Miramar Resort. Taitung County Government was (a) the contracting party for the
Miramar Resort Build-Operate-Transfer project (i.e. the project’s public sector partner);
(b) the competent authority regulating the hotel’s business, given that the EIA was
submitted as a “general” hotel and not as a “tourist” hotel; and (c) the competent
authority overseeing the EIA for the project. The developer (Miramar Resort) mean-
while is the private sector partner for the build-operate-transfer project; the applicant
for the hotel’s development and operation; the producer of the Environmental Impact
Statement for the Miramar Resort; and the organization responsible for the construc-
tion of the resort infrastructure itself. Chan (2013) thus points out that the developer
and the regulator enjoyed a symbiotic relationship across the EIA process. As we dis-
cuss in Section 5, the local government in Taitung County have been argued to be
Figure 1. Location of Taitung County within Taiwan.
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culpable in making the dispute last as long as it has, in that they continued to grant
construction permits to the Resort and did not supervise the developer to undertake a
rigorous EIA. In addition to claims over the legitimacy of the EIA process, claims
around the living rights of indigenous people have also been raised (Wei 2018). After
many years of court orders to stop construction, the EIA which citizens had claimed
was invalid was finally cancelled. As of spring 2021, the resort building remains con-
structed but unused.
3.2. The Taiwanese context: challenges and applicability
An additional contribution of our research to the international literature is as a case of
an EIA controversy for a relatively new democracy. Indeed, the wider socio-economic
context in Taiwan has significant bearing on environmental governance in the country
today, hence is worth outlining briefly here. In 1949, the KMT retreated to Taiwan
after losing the Civil War, constructing rapidly and intensively (Grano 2014; 2015).
Under Martial Law, all decisions were made under a totalitarian process (Williams and
Chang 2008). During this time period, development followed the United States and
Western model, where high-intensity development over a short period of time created
Taiwan’s “economic miracle” (Williams and Chang 2008; Grano 2015). Yet the emer-
gence of serious environmental problems indicates local environments were being sac-
rificed to boost national economic growth (Grano 2015).
Environmentalism in Taiwan initially came from the grassroots level before being
taken up by the middle classes, a large proportion of whom were educated in the
United States in the 1980s (Hsiao 1999; Grano 2015). Along with the end of Martial
Law in 1987, the Environmental Protection Administration was established in response
to environmental problems. Taiwan’s democratic transition in the 1980s to the 1990s
lessened state control and enhanced environmental governance (Grano 2015; Wong
2017). Despite this increasing environmental consciousness, in Taiwan environmental
concerns arguably remain inferior to economic growth among decision-makers
Figure 2. Location of the Miramar Resort in Taitung County.
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(Williams and Chang 2008; Ho 2010). Taiwan’s economy started to embrace neo-
liberalism in the 1990s, as illustrated by cooperation between government and private
sectors on build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects (Tai, Kong, and Kou 2013).
Taiwan’s Environmental Impact Assessment Act was enacted based on the United
States’ EIA Law in 1994, and was initially criticized as a means of helping bureaucrats
to “rubber stamp” construction (Ho 2004; Tai, Kong, and Kou 2013). The EIA Act
has also arguably come too late, lacking independence and being over-simplified (Tai,
Kong, and Kou 2012; Chen 2014). Although Taiwan has followed the United States’
EIA template, some contents differ. Taiwan’s EIA asks the project developer to provide
Table 2. Roles of key actors within Miramar Resort development, EIA and operation.
Organization Sector Roles in Miramar Resort controversy
Citizen of the Earth
Hualien and
Taitung Office
Third sector/NGO Organization of protest activities against
development, such as protest concert,
walk from Taitung to Taipei, and
calling for publication of arbitration
proceedings.
Miramar Resort Private sector  Private sector partner for the
Miramar Resort BOT project;
 Applicant for hotel’s development
and operation;
 Producer of the Environmental
Impact Statement for the Miramar
Resort; and the organization
responsible for the construction of






Local government  Contracting party for the Miramar
Resort BOT (build-operate-
transfer) project (i.e. public
sector partner);
 Competent authority regulating
Miramar Resort hotel business;




Third sector/NGO Network of academics and citizens,
organizing early protests against
development and reporting of
violations/participation in citizen
litigation actions. Taitung branch of
Taiwan Environmental
Protection Union.
Tzu-Tung Tribe Community Amis indigenous group living in area
around resort development. Some
members of the group coordinated
opposition to the development on an
individual/personal basis through
physical and online campaigning.
Wild at Heart Legal
Defence Association
Third sector/NGO Opposition to project via citizen
litigation, formation of alliances with
other third sector organizations/
environmental NGOs, and hosting of
press conferences to build Taiwan-
wide awareness of issue.
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an environmental assessment report, with the assessing experts gathering only for the
assessment meetings – which act as the final decision for the project (Tu 2012). This
“quick build” way of processing the EIA, under a constrained timeframe, presents many
shortcomings, such as over-reliance on techno-scientific knowledge, inaccuracy of
reports, and insufficient communication between experts and local residents such as indi-
genous people (Tu 2012). Indeed, it has been argued that an uncritical reliance on
“science” has contributed to environmental crises in Taiwan (Hsiao 1990), with techno-
logical determinism and technocratic governance weakening public participation and
leading to deficiencies in Taiwanese EIAs (Hsu and Hsu 2001; Tai, Kong, and
Kou 2013).
In short, there remains a general belief in the reasonable, objective, and neutral
nature of science within Taiwan. Yet such reliance on “objective” evidence when
assessing the effects of a proposed development risks neglecting other factors such as
communication between stakeholders, local residents’ voices, or indigenous people’s
culture in disputes (Fan 2006; Tu 2012). Since 2018 the EPA has begun a review and
amendment of the EIA Act, proposing to add a sub-law of social impact assessment
under the EIA Act (EIA Act Article Five from Environmental Protection
Administration 2018). Recent research into EIAs in Taiwan has focused on the effi-
ciency and perfection of EIA processes (Tu 2012; Chen 2014); discussing the improve-
ment of EIAs in relation to existing ideology (Tai, Kong, and Kou 2013; Chen 2014);
and the politicization of environmental issues to garner political support (Chen 2014;
Grano 2015).
4. Methodology
This paper takes a single case study approach. As per Yin (1984), the value of a single
case study lies in contributing to theory, rather than providing generalizations across
society. In this regard, the study aims to contribute to understandings of how propo-
nents of a development (in this case a developer and a local authority working in part-
nership) can act to manipulate the good intentions of an EIA process, by providing an
empirical evaluation of themes identified in extant scholarship into the socio-political
dimensions of EIAs and challenges around fair and equitable participation in EIAs.
Although we do not claim our results are representative of a larger population, it is
nonetheless the case that empirical studies of environmental controversies in east- and
south-east Asia are more limited than counterparts from the Global North (Fan, Chiu,
and Mabon 2020); hence the study also aims to contribute to the geographical diversity
of extant literature on the social dimensions of EIA controversies. We return to draw
links to this wider literature in Section 6.
4.1. Collation and qualitative content analysis of textual materials
The first step of the research involved collation and qualitative content analysis
(Mayring 2019) of statements and reports relating to the dispute and to the environ-
mental assessment process. The objective of this was to construct a broad-based under-
standing of the types of arguments used by key actors in the Miramar Resort dispute,
and understand the different standpoints at play. Relevant material was collected by
sampling news reporting and the online presence of organizations with an interest in
the dispute (identified through news reports). These included the Miramar Resort’s
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official website, blogs of opposition groups, environmental NGO websites, and
news sites (see Table 3 below). Notes of the content of these websites were taken to
compare similarities and differences in the argumentation used, and subsequent ana-
lysis followed a directed content analysis approach, as outlined in more depth in
Section 4.3., whereby the content of material was assigned to pre-determined catego-
ries relating to overarching research questions the study sought to address.
4.2. In-depth interviews
Whilst the documentary material consulted is of value in mapping out the standpoints
of the actors and their lines of argumentation, it may be less useful in clarifying the
wider contextual factors which inform how people make sense of the impacts of a
development on their lives. Given the complexity of factors raised in Section 2 around
EIAs, peripheral communities, and environmental assessment processes, in-depth inter-
views were conducted to assess how the Miramar EIA debate fits into broader narra-
tives of a sense of place and an appropriate development trajectory for Shanyuan Bay
and Taitung County.
Following the methodology outlined in Huang and Mabon (2021) semi-structured
interviews were conducted with seven key informants, representing five organizations
closely related to the development and two outsiders with previous experience of the
issue. Recruitment sought to represent a number of viewpoints relating to the Miramar
issue. Initial participants were identified through the content analysis outlined in
Section 4.1. (see Table 4), and further interviewees were recruited via the “snowball”
sampling method. Research of this nature, which draws wider insights from in-depth
consideration of specific cases, requires the views of those who can provide context-
specific understanding through their significant knowledge of the issue at hand.
Accordingly, focused samples of comparable size, targeted at those who can make
meaningful contributions to the dataset, have been used in analogous case-based
research elsewhere (e.g. Mehnen, Mose, and Strijker 2013; Boeckmann 2016;
Nordberg and Salmi 2019).
Table 3. Core documentation consulted for qualitative content analysis.
Opponents
The Taitung Environmental Protection Union http://taitung-place.blogspot.co.uk
The Shanyuan Tzu-Tung tribe blog http://fulafulak.blogspot.co.uk/
Taiwan Environmental Information Center http://e-info.org.tw/
Citizen of the Earth, Taiwan http://www.cet-taiwan.org/
Public Facebook group: Oppose
the Miramar Resort
https://www.facebook.com/fan.liwan




Miramar Resort and Taitung County Government
The Miramar Resort official website http://www.miramarfacts.com.tw/
Public Facebook group: Shanyuan lido https://www.facebook.com/shanyuanbeach
Taitung County Government http://www.taitung.gov.tw/
Central Administration
Environmental Protection Administration
Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan)
https://www.epa.gov.tw/
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Interviews proceeded around a loose set of questions, with further follow-up ques-
tions depending on interviewees’ responses. Therefore, the questions of each inter-
viewee were slightly different, following the idea of a semi-structured interview as a
“guided conversation” (Bryman 2012). However, each interview sought to cover (a)
the respondents’ general views toward the Miramar Resort and the EIA process; (b)
the history and context of their relationship to the issue; (c) their perceptions of fair-
ness within the project; (d) their thoughts on how environmental assessment ought to
proceed in such socially-complicated situations such as the Miramar dispute; and (e)
their own personal environmental values to understand the wider context of their
responses to the issue. All interviewees consented to participate in and knew the pur-
pose of the research. All interviews were undertaken in Chinese.
4.3. Analysis
Both the documentary and interview analysis proceeded according to directed qualita-
tive content analysis, meaning that the materials were read to identify pre-determined
ideas and themes, but that the researcher was also free to note any other themes which
had not been expected beforehand yet appeared significant (e.g. Mayring 2019; Hsieh
and Shannon 2005). As outlined in Huang and Mabon (2021), this allowed for rela-
tively structured analysis between cases and enabled the documentary material and the
interview material to be considered together under common themes (Cho and Lee
2014) given the relatively small sample size, but also gave room for us to note new
themes and material emerging during the reading. Accordingly, material was read and
coded primarily for statements which (a) indicated the speaker’s overall standpoint
toward the Miramar conflict; (b) indicated the speaker’s perceptions of the impact
assessment process, including both what constituted an “impact” and how the process
itself was undertaken; and (c) gave an indication of how and in what ways participants
Table 4: Summary of Interviewees and Relationship to Conflict.
Organization/role Relationship to conflict
Miramar Resort Senior Representative Employee of developer, responsible for official
statements and public-facing opinion pieces.
Taitung County Government /
Taitung Tourism Bureau
Investment, promotion and investigation
organization of this project; and organizer of
EIA meetings. As Taitung Tourism Bureau, a
division of Taitung County Government, the role
is to issue the certification for the Miramar
Resort to operate.
Local indigenous activist Opponent to project from indigenous community.
Online opposition group administrator One of the managers of “Facebook group: Oppose
the Miramar Resort”; author of academic paper
on EIA in Taiwan.
Environmental NGO Core environmental protection group opposing the
Miramar Resort; also participated in national
news programme on resort controversy.
Environmental educator Attended sixth EIA meeting.
Social observation project student Student who visited Tzu-Tung tribe and wrote a
report discussing the cultural conflict from the
Miramar issue.
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indicated their values toward the environment (e.g. statements ascribing an economic
value to the natural environment; statements ascribing a spiritual value to the natural
environment etc). All analysis was undertaken as far as possible on the original
Chinese material, with indicative quotes subsequently translated into English.
Compared to our previous research in this area which focused more narrowly on the
controversy around the Miramar Resort in relation to issues of sustainable consumption
(Huang and Mabon 2021), in the findings and analysis that follows we conduct new
and further analysis into how different actors viewed the Miramar Resort EIA contro-
versy, and how they justified or opposed the developer and local government’s com-
bined efforts to direct the EIA process toward approval of the resort.
4.4. Rigour
Our methodology was guided by the four principles of rigour in qualitative research
elaborated for geographical research by Baxter and Eyles (1997). Credibility was
worked toward through purposeful sampling, to ensure that interviewees and docu-
ments, whilst giving a small sample size, represented a broad range of different stand-
points on the Miramar controversy, This was supported by persistent observation,
following the debate via media over several years in order to build an in-depth under-
standing among the research team. Transferability was facilitated via the kind of thick
description Baxter and Eyles advocate – that is, whilst we do not claim our results are
generalizable to a wider context, in Section 3 we have sought to provide adequate
information on the Miramar Resort and on the Taiwanese context for a reader to be
able to understand the context of our claims. Dependability is worked toward through
triangulation (i.e. using textual/documentary materials as well as interviews), and
mechanically recorded data via manual noting of key points from texts and quotes
from interviews. Finally, confirmability is facilitated through audit trail products in
Section 5, namely quotes from the in-depth interviews and the documentary analysis to
evidence the points made.
5. Findings
5.1. Actors’ standpoints and rationales
Our first thematic area concerns how different actors involved in the dispute justify
their stance toward the project. Both Taitung County Government and the Miramar
Resort developer claim the project to be “sustainable” in that it uses Shanyuan Bay’s
natural environment as a resource to bring local socio-economic benefit:
Taitung County possesses a lot of natural resources, we choose to work on doing
tourism as our main industry. (Taitung County Government representative)
A good condition of environment is the selling point and demand of our resort’s aim.
Furthermore, the project had signed a 50 year contract, the Miramar Resort will not kill
the goose that lays the golden eggs. (Miramar Resort section manager1)
In both quotes, preservation of environmental quality is argued to be a necessity to
unlock socio-economic benefit. Indeed, Taitung County Government’s wider messag-
ing and publicity taps heavily into this idea of “naturalness” to draw tourists to the
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county (Taitung County Government 2018). By contrast, those in opposition to the
project – or at least with concerns over it – expressed skepticism over the ability of a
development undertaken in the name of uplifting the local economy to actually return
benefit to the area’s citizens:
As the Shanyuan Bay is an aboriginal peoples’ traditional area, the project should get
the agreement from the tribe in the beginning [… ] because of the operation of the local
government to influence the lowly-informed Taitung local community to believe in
economic growth through this project, most of the local people are supporting this
project. (Local indigenous activist)
Although the Miramar Resort provides the public a better service than a lido, a
company which will invest in a lido is not mainly to offer a good service for customers.
They are seeking benefits from these customers. (Online opposition group administrator)
Notably, rationales for opposing the development encompass a range of concerns,
stretching far beyond the potential environmental impacts of the Miramar Resort.
These include lack of trust in the local government’s message of economic growth,
suspicion of the motivations of the developer, and procedural issues relating to who
has the right to make decisions about the land. Even for local social sustainability in
the form of jobs and economic benefit, skepticism exists about the extent to which the
project will benefit the locality. Environmental lawyer Chan Shun-Kuei, was reported
as quoting “the words of Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz [… ] that the development
claimed by Miramar would only concentrate 99% of the benefits in the hands of 1%
of the population, which is not a real public interest, and that the so-called job oppor-
tunities are only low-level jobs” (PeoPo Citizen Journalism 2012: n.p). Miramar coun-
tered this claim by arguing that the resort would employ a number of local young
people – including in management roles – and that the employment would help to
retain local talent and solve other problems such as an aging local population
(Miramar Resort Official Website 2019). Regardless of the veracity of both sides’
claims, this again illustrates the differing interpretations at play as to whether or not a
development predicated on appreciating the environmental quality of the area does
indeed deliver positive social and economic impacts at a local level.
It is also important to note the different actors who come together here in the com-
mon direction of opposing the development. Whereas the indigenous activist is local to
Shanyuan Bay, the Oppose the Miramar Resort opposition group use social media to
gain traction, and other opposition groups are run largely out of the Taipei Metropolis
area and have a nationwide reach. Many of the opponents to the project – those most
vocal in their claims to the environmental and social harms of the resort – are hence
“outsiders” staking a claim to the future of the bay. As we now discuss, this can give
rise to subtle variations in how and why claims to environmental “impact” are made.
5.2. Claim-making around potential environmental “impacts”
We now evaluate how different actors make claims to environmental “impacts” arising
from the Miramar Project. We focus on what kinds of claims are considered admis-
sible within formal planning processes, and also what the potential range of outcomes
from the impact assessment process may be.
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As outlined earlier, environmental “impacts” in Taiwan are understood at govern-
ment level as “biophysical, social and other relevant effects”, which can be identified,
predicted, evaluated and mitigated (Environmental Protection Administration 2019).
This idea of there being an appropriate manner and process through which environ-
mental impacts “ought” to be assessed is adopted by Taitung County Government to
discredit actions from those opposed to the development. In an official statement, the
county government claimed that to derail the Miramar project, some citizens broadened
the interpretation of the judgment recklessly, misled other citizens to believe the build-
ing must be deconstructed before the EIA could be done, and tried to interfere with
the decision making of the EIA investigators (Taitung County Public Work Bureau
2012). Actions lying outside of the formal EIA process and the people undertaking
these actions (e.g. people circulating images and texts through the internet) come to be
viewed as “irrational”. This idea was expressed strongly in Miramar’s official state-
ments, and also by a Taitung County Government representative:
Only few opponents will attend [EIA] meetings, and they are all too emotional.
Sometimes the opponents did not attend the meetings because they would be isolated by
supporters who are the majority. (Taitung County Government representative)
Describing opponents as “emotional” has the effect of allowing both the Taitung
County Government and the Miramar Resort developers to position themselves as tak-
ing a reasonable stance. An interviewed Miramar Resort representative for instance
stated that “the Miramar Resort always hope they could have a rational conversation
with the opponents” (interview with Miramar Resort senior representative). The work
of Miramar to position themselves as a “rational” actor is reflected in the title of web-
site which the developer built to set out their position on the controversy – “Miramar
Facts” (http://www.miramarfacts.com.tw, now offline). Positioning actions lying out-
side of the formalized, measurable EIA process as being irrational also has the effect
of closing down the debate and excluding – or at least portraying as somehow negative
and of less value - a number of more value- or emotion-driven arguments against the
resort. Consider, for instance, the following:
The aboriginal people often regard the mountains or the ocean as our mother, you can
say you love your mother, you are a child of the ocean, but only share the environment,
not possess it. (Local indigenous activist2)
I am selfish since I yearn for leaving these beautiful mountains and seas to our next
generations. In order to achieve this selfishness, we only could keep making effort on it.
(Environmental NGO representative)
In both cases, the respondents’ concerns about the development come from a deep-
seated sense of who they are and how this drives their view of what a sustainable tra-
jectory is for the landscape. Similar to Cass and Walker (2009), this illustrates that
regardless of any claims to “rationality” or otherwise, emotions can and do drive peo-
ple’s responses to changes in the environment in profound ways. As such, attempts to
dismiss such arguments as “irrational” and lying outside of EIA structures may under-
estimate the strength of feeling and resolve held and/or lead decision-makers to miss
the point of why some people oppose developments such as Miramar. In any case,
even within empirically-driven, process-based EIAs, as per Bradbury et al. (1994),
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Miramar opponents are able to use the language of science and decision-making to jus-
tify their opposition:
Since humans’ life relies on the environment, the environment is very important to us.
In my opinion, the environment’s value is levelled by its degree of development.
(Online opposition group administrator)
We only heard the Miramar Resort makes a lot of promises, but we do not know “how”
they exactly fulfil their promises. What is more, in fact, the condition of engagement is
based on the fact that we cannot ask them to deconstruct. (Local indigenous activist)
Here, the logic of understanding natural systems and of using an EIA as a basis for
decision-making are turned on their head by opponents. In the first quote, humans’
dependency on the environment is drawn in to suggest the resort may pose a threat to
humans’ lives. In the second, Miramar and Taitung County Government’s lack of spe-
cificity in clarifying the range of outcomes that may be possible from the EIA (i.e.
deconstruction not an option) challenges the very idea of an EIA being used to guide
the most fitting course of action. This questioning of the EIA process itself forms our
final area of concern.
5.3. Contestation over the EIA process
This section builds on our argument in Section 5.2. about the kinds of arguments that
are seen to count in relation to the Miramar Resort’s potential environmental impact.
Over time, the Miramar Resort debate seems to become more about the propriety of
the EIA process, rather than the substantive nature of any environmental impacts. This
touches on issues of justice in both the process itself and recognition of those with a
stake in the issue.
From a procedural perspective, the perceived inadequacy of citizen consultation is
explicitly cited in opposition from Citizen of the Earth, a Taiwan-wide environmental
organization:
The Miramar Resort project, from rendering the profile to doing the EIA and
construction process, is not in accordance with the procedural justice process. The
Taitung County Government misinterpreted the laws and ignored the administrative
court’s judgement. This act will encourage other projects to follow. This goes against
sustainable development and green economics. (Citizen of the Earth, content
from petition)
Here, fair process is argued to be an integral part of sustainable development more
generally. Under this argumentation, an inadequate EIA does not only risk environ-
mental damage, but may also contribute to an unsustainable societal form. Concerns
over lack of meaningful opportunity to participate in the process seem at least in part
supported by the content of illustration meetings and records of citizen interaction,
which are attached to the Miramar Resort’s environmental impact statement (Miramar
Resort Project Environmental Impact Statement, Miramar Resort 2008). According to
the first illustration meeting in 2006, no more than ten local people attended it, with
discussion on job opportunities and preferential services for the local community.
Although the voices of opponents appear until 2007, from what the records show
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(Miramar Resort Project Illustration Meeting 2006 and 2007, Miramar Resort n.d.), the
form of the meeting is set as people asking questions and then the resort answering, as
opposed to a more dialogic or conversational format.
From a recognition perspective too, interviews revealed differing perspectives on
the appropriateness or effectiveness of consultation meetings:
Citizens were informed only three days before the [Sixth] EIA [Meeting, 2 June 2012].
What is more, general citizens could not sit in and convey opinions by paper, only the
representatives of each side (support and against) could attend the meeting and make
contributions. (Local indigenous activist)
We did not communicate with each other, each side’s standpoint is very clear.
Therefore, the perspectives have nothing in common with each other [… ] an ideal
communication in Taitung communities, especially with indigenous groups, is difficult
to occur. (Online opposition group administrator)
The online opposition group administrator goes on to elaborate that the difficulty
of an ideal communication seems to be that as Taitung County is a less-developed
area, most of the adults are moving out to the west part of Taiwan for jobs (as per the
socio-economic data presented in Section 3). Therefore, the local communities are
formed mainly by children and older people, and those who have less ability and
knowledge to speak for themselves and may even be willing to follow any policies
that the government decides. Moreover, disenfranchized populations also include indi-
genous people, where problems will probably be more serious since some older people
cannot even speak Mandarin (interview with social observation student). These claims
indicate that to even participate in the EIA, one would require a certain level of know-
ledge of how the system works, and be able to speak Mandarin. This gives rise to
potential for claims of injustice in recognition, given the difference between the ideal-
ized EIA process and the characteristics of the local community directly affected.
What comes across strongly in the above is that the Miramar Resort EIA contro-
versy goes far beyond contestation over the environmental impacts themselves. Rather,
the controversy becomes about different kinds of people and different identities, who
is considered able to participate in decision-making, and who has the power to make
decisions about the future development trajectory of the landscape. Further complicat-
ing this process, it is also worth reiterating that within the coalition of opposition there
exist a range of identities and affiliations. Each of these may have their own differing
views on what an ideal society ought to be, yet they are able to coalesce around the
idea of the Miramar Project as an example of how they do not wish decisions about
the environment to be made.
6. Discussion
We discuss our findings and their implications for scholarly literature on the socio-pol-
itical aspects of EIAs by returning to the characteristics of EIA manipulation identified
by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018). We consider these characteristics in groups, and
discuss if and to what extent each is present in the Miramar case. Based on the
Miramar experience, we also offer insight into additional ways in which developers
and proponents may conspire to manipulate an EIA process.
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A first cluster of characteristics identified by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) con-
cerns the presentation of information within an EIA – specifically false information,
exaggerated information, or hidden information. Whilst there is no evidence of out-
right false information in the Miramar EIA process, there are arguably claims of hid-
den and exaggerated information on the part of the developer. Hidden information
comes through concealing the true purpose of the resort at the outset of the EIA pro-
cess – by registering the hotel as a “general” hotel and not a “tourist” hotel and
thereby influencing the parameters against which the EIA is judged – and through
marking a piece of adjacent land on the environmental statement merely as a “hillside”
and not as land with significance to the local indigenous population (Huang and
Mabon 2021). In both these cases, information which could influence the scope and
content of the EIA is hidden by omission. Claims to exaggerated information, mean-
while, arise in Miramar in relation to the perceived economic and employment benefits
of the development to the local community. As outlined in Section 5.1., the develop-
er’s arguments of employment and economic benefit are challenged by resort oppo-
nents on precisely the grounds that the information provided by the developer is
exaggerated (PeoPo Citizen Journalism 2012). However, in relation to Enriquez de
Salamanca’s observations, what the Miramar resort shows is that it may be difficult to
prove a developer or authority is concealing information by omission or exaggerating
impacts. In this sense, the Miramar findings reinforce those of Puig and Villarroya
(2013) in the Basque context on the need for acknowledgement of the limitations of
economic projections within EIA processes; and Fan (2016) in the Taiwanese context
on the difficulties of understanding and delineating local cultural heritage within more
technically-driven EIA processes.
A second characteristic identified by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) is that of false
alternatives or unnecessary elements. Whilst Enriquez de Salamanca makes this point
in the context of a developer creating the illusion of choice by proposing unfeasible or
undesirable alternatives and thus guiding the EIA toward a desired outcome, false
alternatives arise for Miramar as the creation of an arguably false choice between
allowing the development to happen or losing out on economic growth opportunities.
For instance, after the Miramar developer withdrew from the project in 2018 following
repeated failures to gain EIA approval, Taitung County Mayor Huang Chien-Ting was
quoted as saying that “most of the opponents are not local people, they don’t under-
stand Taitung’s development, they think they are righteous, yet they ignore the impact
of this dispute could lead to a chilling effect and let Taitung’s beautiful 176 km coast-
line become useless and deterring enterprises to invest” (UDN News 2018). Attempts
to steer environmental assessments and environmental controversies toward an either-
or dichotomy have similarly been identified in other industrializing peripheral regions
by Fan, Chiu, and Mabon (2020), who observed developers telling opponents to the
Ha Tinh Steel plant in Vietnam to “choose” between steel or shrimp farming; and by
Childs (2019) in relation to the Solwara 1 deep sea mining project off the coast of
Papua New Guinea, where developers and proponents position deep-sea mining as
“necessary” to provide raw materials for green energy infrastructures. In terms of
Enriquez de Salamanca’s principle of false alternatives or unnecessary elements within
an EIA, what the Miramar Resort indicates is that a developer or proponent may intro-
duce false choice dichotomies as a way of closing down the EIA to a narrow discourse
of modernization for a locality, in a way that sidelines potential for the continuation
of, for example, small-scale or artisanal practices (Spiegel 2017).
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A third set of characteristics drawn out by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) is to
undervalue or overvalue impacts. What happened at Miramar was that – deliberately
or otherwise – the commencement of construction before completion of the EIA made
it difficult to establish whether any environmental impacts were in fact the result of
the development. NGO Citizen of the Earth claimed, on the basis of coral reef exami-
nations and onshore ecological surveys, that buried construction waste from the resort
had caused heavy metal pollution. However, as construction had already commenced,
it became difficult to produce a formally acknowledged baseline against which claims
to environmental “impact” (like those made by Citizen of the Earth) could be assessed
or valued. As well as the obvious point that an EIA is insufficient to guard against
damage to the environment if it cannot be undertaken and enforced prior to the com-
mencement of development, the Miramar controversy adds nuance to Enriquez de
Salamanca’s observation of the under- or over-valuing of impacts by illustrating the
subjective nature of evidence-making for environmental valuation and impact assess-
ment (see also Puig and Villarroya (2013) in the Basque context on the difficulties of
delineating damage to fish farms caused by environmental interventions). Furthermore,
building on Smart, Stojanovic, and Warren’s (2014), claims to the under- or over-valu-
ation of environmental impacts specific to a development may become even harder to
verify as developments take place under an ever-intensifying backdrop of global envir-
onmental change.
A fourth cluster of characteristics identified by Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) is
administrative manipulation of the EIA process and the use of confusing or complex
information. This transpired in the Miramar case in two ways. First, administrative
manipulation of the EIA process happened by dividing the resort site into two smaller
land packages, in order to allow resort building construction to commence and to cir-
cumvent the need for a full-scale EIA (Chan 2013). Second, both administrative
manipulation and the creation of confusion and complexity were apparent in the com-
munity engagement processes around the development. As outlined in Sections 5.2.
and 5.3., consultations were held at short notice and with the requirement to register in
advance to speak, and were held only in Mandarin. Whilst arguably an acceptable
form of consultation under local EIA legislation, such actions may be considered
administrative manipulation and creation of complexity if they make participation in
the EIA process impossible to all but the most active and vocal members of the com-
munity, or to civil society groups from elsewhere in Taiwan with the political nous to
know how to work within the constraints of an EIA process and/or generate contro-
versy through, for instance, social media and coordinated protests. The contribution the
Miramar case makes to Enriquez de Salamanca’s concerns over administrative manipu-
lation of the EIA process, and the use of confusing or complex information, is that
even if an EIA is conducted within a developer’s interpretation of the law (i.e. even if
the use of outright false information, bribery and extortion are avoided), the outcome
may not be consented to by communities and opponents if the consultation process is
not perceived as open and fair or if it raises barriers to participation. This has of
course been well covered in the EIA literature, both in Taiwan (e.g. Tu [2010] on the
Central Taiwan Science Park) and globally (e.g. Smart, Stojanovic, and Warren (2014)
on EIA processes for onshore wind on Scotland being viewed as ‘biased’ toward
developers). However, in newer democracies and/or contexts where concern for due
process is not so established, the Miramar case illustrates how the bare legal minimum
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for consultation in an EIA may not in itself be enough to build consent for
the outcome.
Finally, there is little evidence of self-censorship (albeit because the local govern-
ment – and thus the project promoter, regulator and competent authority – has come
out strongly in favor of the development); of bribes and kickbacks; or of extortion. It
is worth noting though that with the project effectively canceled, in an arbitration hear-
ing in October 2020 Taitung County Government was ordered to pay NTD 629 million
to buy the building back, with no immediate plans for its reuse – thereby having a dir-
ect negative effect on the local economy as a result of the development outcome.
The Miramar case also reveals an additional tactic deployed by the developer
and EIA proponents which Enrıquez-de-Salamanca (2018) does not touch on so
explicitly – discrediting evidence and testimony. As per Section 5.2., arguments against
the developer grounded in local and indigenous understandings of the bay, or in con-
cerns over the effects on future generations, did not appear to have been given consid-
eration within the EIA process for the Miramar resort. The local government also
described opponents’ arguments as being “emotional” or “irrational” and hence
inappropriate for consideration in an EIA forum. Moreover, actions such as holding
consultations in Mandarin (as opposed to traditional local languages), and the develop-
er’s establishment of a website titled “Miramar Facts” (http://www.miramarfacts.com.
tw, now offline) can all be seen as seeking to devalue and discredit certain kinds of
argumentation in favor of seemingly objective “facts”. Such actions to devalue or dis-
credit the contributions of participants in an EIA process may be considered a form of
epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) if they lead to people and perspectives being over-
looked from processes of defining and understanding social problems on account of
the identity of the speaker, or the language/type of knowledge they use to make their
claims. Consideration of how to embed traditional, local and indigenous knowledge
into environmental assessment processes is still emerging globally (see e.g. Eckert
et al. (2020) on the limitations of Canadian environmental assessment legislation to
engage indigenous knowledge; and Sandham, Chabalala, and Spaling (2019) on linking
participatory rural appraisal on EIAs in South Africa). The Miramar findings hence
illustrate that even if opportunities for participation in the EIA process are provided,
these may be of limited value if they are not supported by measures to ensure contrib-
utors’ testimonies and knowledge are treated with credibility.
7. Conclusion
We started from the premise that the implementation and evaluation of an EIA is a
social process intrinsically bound up with uneven power relations and limitations to
what can be known with certainty, and that development-oriented proponents could
seek to exploit the limitations of otherwise well-intentioned EIA regulations in order
to engineer a desired outcome. Through assessment of the controversy around the EIA
process for the Miramar Resort in Shanyuan Bay, Taitung County, Taiwan, we have
sought to build on this extant literature by assessing an empirical case where the devel-
oper and local government appear to have worked together to circumvent an EIA pro-
cess. Eastern Taiwan is perhaps typical of a number of emerging economy and new
democracy contexts where socio-economic development imperatives and environmental
goals have the potential to conflict with one another, and where local governments
may ultimately be the people who have to balance these objectives through processes
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such as granting permission for new developments. However, our findings from
Taitung County show that a drive for social and economic development in order to
“level up” with the rest of the country can, if not managed sensitively, lead to a rela-
tionship of dependency with external investors and result in situations such as that in
Miramar whereby local authorities appear to actively work with developers to circum-
vent environmental protection legislation. Indeed, the Miramar Resort is one of a num-
ber of tourist-oriented developments in Taitung County in recent years, leading to
concerns over development fatigue and skepticism over the benefits to local commun-
ities (Indigenous Sight 2019). The responses from participants in our study suggest
communities may not necessarily see economic and employment improvements as a
fair tradeoff for culturally meaningful landscapes. Finally, whilst our findings are
largely consistent with what has been written in extant research, a particularly notable
finding is that as part of efforts to thwart due process within EIAs, proponents of
developments may work to discredit the experiences or knowledge of other actors in
the controversy, for instance by dismissing their concerns as “emotional” or irrational
or by sidelining traditional, local and indigenous knowledge within the EIA process.
Further research may hence wish to explore strategies for ensuring that different expe-
riences and knowledge systems can not only participate, but are also recognized,
within social and environmental impact assessments.
Notes
1. Also quoted in Huang and Mabon (2021).
2. Also quoted in Huang and Mabon (2021).
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